Sunday, March 3, 2024

The last interview with Colonel Francisco Bolognesi

 





 The last interview with Colonel Francisco Bolognesi

Published on 06-07-2020 Current source: La Crónica Viva Newspaper 2024

 

 

Two weeks before his immolation, on June 7, 1880 in the Battle of Arica, Colonel Francisco Bolognesi was interviewed by a correspondent from the newspaper “Rejistro Official” of Ayacucho. Another treasure of the thousands that can be found in libraries. 140 years later, the colonel does have someone to read it.

 

The heroism of duty

 

It was May 23, 1880. The Peruvian-Bolivian Army, gathered in Tacna, had taken its positions in the “Campo de la Alianza” and was awaiting the attack of the invader, who could be seen with the help of a telescope. few miles away.

 

The writer of this line was sent that day to Arica, on an important commission, aboard the Monitor Manco-Cápac.

 

The extraordinary train left for the neighboring port at 5 pm in order to reach its destination at night and thus avoid the cannonade of the enemy squadron, which was positioned in front of the mouth of the Lluta and Chacalluta valleys and out of the reach of the ground batteries, prevented the convoy from moving.

 

The few passengers who were on the express, naturally, looked for the best accommodation and I headed to the house of D J de M., a notable resident of the place, a very dignified and respectable person, whose obsequious hospitality I will never be able to forget.

 

The Head of the Plaza had established his residence in the aforementioned house and had the greatest satisfaction in knowing that I came from the heights of Tacna and that I could give him reliable news of what was happening in the camp, since it is notable that despite the short distance that separates it from that city, and despite the telegraph and railway that connect them, in that city not the slightest was known regarding the enemy's movements, the number of troops it had and the greater or lesser probability of victory for the enemy. our parts.




 

Colonel Bolognesi, to whom I was introduced, after making the most pleasant memories of my father, of whom he was a companion and friend, entered into the following dialogue with me:

 

-Come on, you who come from Tacna will be able to give me certain news about our troops, since what we receive here is either very late or does not satisfy in any way.

 

-Sir, our Army occupies the same positions that General Campero took: its state of mind is satisfactory even for the most demanding patriotism and it has received greater encouragement, if possible, with the incorporation of the “Tacna Division”, commanded by the prefect Dr. Solar and which is made up of the Gendarmeries of the Departments of Tacna and Tarapacá, the Police forces and the National Guard, which includes people from all social conditions, who have not hesitated to offer their contingent of blood , in defense of our cause: everything, then, ensures an upcoming victory and it is believed that the Chileans, given the resolute attitude of the Allied Army, will not dare to advance and will change their plan of attack.

 

-What a crazy think! Is the number of the enemy's forces known?

 

-I don't know, sir, if our bosses are behind this, but I believe that nothing is known for certain and that the calculations made on the matter are risky.

 

-So, how do you want us to succeed? Is it possible, is it rational to trust in victory over an enemy, whose numerical strength is not known? Why hasn't an espionage service been organized near him, to communicate to us all the data that interests us? Why don't we imitate our enemies, who are aware of the least that happens in our camp and who are not even aware of the number of soldiers we have in the hospitals?

 

-It seems to me, sir, that, if our bosses lack that important information, instead they have taken their measures to counteract any advantage that the Chileans have over us, and for the same reason, no one doubts for a moment the victory.

Hey friend! You, like the majority of our compatriots, see everything rosy; But it is necessary to convince ourselves that our condition cannot be sadder: a series of errors in every sense have marked this war from the beginning, and, therefore, I do not see the outcome as favorable to our cause. When the enemy Army has decided to attack us in our own positions, it is because it has measured all the inconveniences that could arise in its path and has found the means to overcome them; It is because he has complete security of achieving victory, since this is guaranteed with his greater number of troops, with the relatively superior power of his three weapons and with the courage that is consequent to the advantages that have been acquired over the opponent. Why, before it overtook Sama, had a respectable force not been deployed on the coast of Tarapacá? With this measure, it is more than likely that his attention would have been drawn to that side, and that his plan would have changed completely.

 

-Apart from the serious risks that would have been presented for such an expedition, I believe that there were not sufficiently mobile elements to carry it out.

-No, well, you are wrong. During the time I have been in charge of Arica I have provided the Allied Army with more than 900 mules, taken from the valleys of Azapa and Lluta and Chacalluta. Having been given command of the expeditionary force, I would have sought the necessary mobility and would also have been responsible for its success. The current condition of this Plaza could not be more regrettable; Everyone believes it to be impregnable and yet it will not be able to resist the enemy, in a combined attack of sea and land: the number of its defenders is so small that they can easily be overwhelmed in a moment.

 

 

- Is it possible, sir, that such is its condition? When we all consider it as a bastion before which the enemy's efforts will crash, in the event of a disaster, all the more so since it is the point of retreat rather than the sole reason. advise.

 

-What I'm telling you, friend. If the next battle is unfavorable to us, as I fear most, Arica is lost and without remedy, because we will be isolated, because the enemy will bring here all his victorious troops, to attack us in combination with his squad, because we will have to resign ourselves to our situation. luck. I know how to tell you that, as a citizen and as Head of this Plaza; I will prefer to die rather than surrender, even so that our compatriots may be encouraged by our conduct, even so that History may say in its pages, when speaking of this war:

 

“The defenders of Arica, despite the desperate nature of their condition, fulfilled their duty, preferring to die in their position rather than implore the mercy of the victor.”

 

Pronouncing such sublime words, which revealed his refined patriotism and the greatness of his soul, we were interrupted by the arrival of two officers who came to report on a commission.

 

I said goodbye to Colonel Bolognesi so I would never see him again.

 

Juan Carlos Flórez Granda, director of SEHCAP (Coronel Arnaldo Panizo Historical Studies Society), found this gem while conducting research to prepare a historical profile of Colonel Francisco Bolognesi. The article does not have a signature and was published on January 7, 1882 in the “Registro Oficial” newspaper of Ayacucho.

 

Investigation: Walter Sosa Vivanco



With affection,

Ruben

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